~~~
If all interactions are inherently coercive, and in my mind
similar to gravity, I would like to add my own mass in here and invite you to
think with me on a few things. Before I
go on, I wanted to clarify that I do not have a set position on this yet, and
am hesitant in stating that I have decided on a position. In fact, I am unsure that I would agree with
the idea of taking a position - unless it is my own dynamic position that I
have subjectively decided on.
First, let me begin by providing some context on how I got
here. Bryan Meyer and I have been
conversing over DM (twitter was a poor medium for in depth discussions) for a
while about a variety of different topics.
More recently I asked about how he has identified his position with
respect to learning and knowing. To
this, he responded that he identifies with forms of radical constructivism, and
stated that the "social" was accounted for through the idea of
intersubjectivity. A few more
back-and-forths later, he asked if I thought of mathematics as invented or
discovered (yes, we were still conversing through twitter at this point...
silly us).
Looking back, I think my answer would have differed if he had
asked whether I thought the "learning and knowing" of mathematics was
invented or discovered. Regardless, this
is what I said:
"Here are my current thoughts on that: I think it's
both. I think mathematics is
individually invented, but collectively discovered. With respect to mathematics as a subject, I
like Shapiro's view of structuralism, where mathematics exist as structural relationships.
To make sense of ideas in mathematics, one must "invent" concepts
from being situated with the rest of existing knowledge, or resolving cognitive
dissonance. At the same time,
mathematics as a social practice is discovered collectively. If mathematics is a landscape of buildings,
then individuals are inventing different parts of the buildings on their own,
but others are inventing the exact same things.
The superimposed image of mathematics is the structural relationship
that is discovered."
We left this a bit (because we were still on twitter and it
was difficult to flesh everything out) and we went on to having him describe
his personal epistemology. To this he
stated that no knowledge is external to the knower, and therefore it is invented.
I responded with:
"...back to my thoughts on how mathematics is
"individually invented, but collectively discovered." I am basically attempting to make a case for
a duality between invention and discovery.
Mathematics as something to be individually constructed in the process
of sense making -- which I think is where you are coming from, and I agree with
this. On the other hand, I believe that
there is an existence of mathematical properties prior to my construction of
concepts. e.g. the concept of addition.
My thinking is that in the process of our individually making sense of addition
(for ourselves), this is a kind of collective discovery of some sort of
structural property of mathematical objects - in the sense of e.g. Shapiro's
concept of structuralism. But I am not set in stone with respect to my personal
epistemologies, learning theories, and theories about the nature of
mathematics...I think your question is - then how is it possibly inventing if
it already exists? I am currently
reading about the phenomenology of practice which I think may have had an
influence on my current thinking.
Imagine the concept of a bridge.
Imagine an individual who has no knowledge of this concept. As this individual becomes familiar with the
concept of a bridge - in whatever way they choose to define bridge - they are
constructing their own idea of what a bridge is - in relation to the rest of
what they understand. And this act is invention to me -the construction of a
concept with relation to an existing body of knowledge that the individual has
constructed so far... I am unsure if you have seen the movie "the gods
must be crazy," but, the idea is hat a coke bottle falls from a plane to a
village, and then the villagers began to use the bottle for things outside of
what the bottle is typically used for in our culture. The development of what it is and what it is
used for, would be invention. However, at the same time, there is pre-existing
properties of the bottle that allows it to tend toward certain inventions. The
process of understanding and identifying these properties - would be
discovery."
After a few more exchanges, we recently moved onto e-mail,
and his post (and your response here) was brought up, along with a few images
of quotes from von Glaserfeld's (1996) book on Radical Constructivism (studies
in mathematical education).
Ok, and now that we're in the present, I hope the above has
invited you enough to our conversation!
Feel free to comment on my existing analogies and half-baked ideas.
First, let me address a wondering from this post &
comments.
"I would argue that as soon as you ask the question,
you have created an unjust space between people--there is no way that one could
be deemed not correct, nor more correct. Each is assumed to be "correct,"
i.e. viable, for that other autonomous being."
I wonder about the degree of justification for
"viability." Even if we stand
on the platform of individualistic ways of knowing, is it not still possible to
identify degrees of "correctness" to the rest of his/her own networks
of constructions? As a simple (and
perhaps ill-formed) example, if I believe in 1+1=2, then if I state that 1+2=2
I would have a less degree of "correctness" to someone who believes
1+2=2, and then state 1+2+1+2=4? My
example is flawed in many ways, but I hope I am somewhat illustrating my
wondering.
Now I'd like to return to the attempt of clarifying my own
tentative position (and in fact without this act of doing so, I would have no
position to speak of).
On mathematics:
As I attempted to illustrate through the copy-and-pasted DM
conversation, I currently envision mathematics as invented and collectively
discovered. I think my current state of
opinion has to do with a combination of different experiences. Thinking back, in an effort to clarify, I
think the aspect that I believe is "invented" is the learning of
mathematics. The aspect that I believe
is "collective discovered" is the nature of mathematics as structural
relationships.
What I am saying here is actually related to my wondering
earlier. Let me attempt another
example. Let's say I am an individual
who has constructed the concept of 1 as a lone object with several properties. This makes sense to me as it relates to my
other constructions through my interactions with the world. As I construct a new concept of 2, I relate
to my previous constructions for the concepts of 1, as well as all of its
innate properties of one-ness. By doing so,
improving my own "correctness" for the concept of 1. The structural relationship that I have
"invented" would then be that 1+1=2.
At the same time, I arrived at this conclusion not only
based on my own constructions of other concepts, but also relying on the
inherent properties of one-ness and two-ness.
I am unsure if that example was any good... I suppose this relates to my tentative
thinking that while abstract mathematical "objects" do not exist, the
structural relationships amongst objects - do.
Thoughts? Comments?
This is all getting very foggy for me now haha.
*note* This whole discussion actually is reminiscent of when
I was studying the various philosophies of mathematics (which I am unsure I
have decided on a strongly set position there either).
knowledge / mathematics -- invented or discovered?: The constructivist takes the viewpoint that the desired answer is not a knowable. To be able to know such an answer would require an omniscient observer, which none of us are. And so any answer beyond something to the effect of what I know I can only attribute to myself requires some sort of statement of faith.
ReplyDeleteSome argue this may be a solipsistic stance. It may be. Many constructivists will argue that it is not because they posit some sort of external reality, which they have some certainty does exist because it "kicks back" when one's own knowing doesn't align well to it. Meaning, in essence, that if our constructed model for the world is not well aligned, does not allow for a viable negotiation of that world, it lets us know.
When the constructivist considers this world external to oneself, her/she includes the alike other, another independent entity to which the same properties for knowing and learning are attributed. And as such, this thing called knowledge (or mathematics) is taken to be shared. Until some sort of interaction seems to disrupt that taken-as-shared understanding and the knower resolves the conflict between ones own knowledge and that which is attributed to the other.
To claim "mathematics is collectively discovered" is a statement by you, an individual knower. If that belief remains viable, it seems perfectly adequate for a way of thinking. It seems, from my perspective, that you could not make such a claim without a leap of faith, akin to assuming you are able to attain an omniscient perspective on what constitutes knowledge (mathematics) and how it emerges.
ReplyDeleteYou say, "I believe that there is an existence of mathematical properties prior to my construction of concepts." That belief is fine with me for you to have, see my previous comment--it is a belief.
ReplyDeleteFor me, the "concept of addition" is a result of the biological structure of human-ness (or human-being). Just as anthropomorphizing ideas of counting and addition to other animals occurs, we attribute the awareness that our own addition seems to be so alike that of all these other humans we come in contact with that it must be universal, have existed prior to us.
But do not forget, one human is genetically 99.9% identical to other humans (http://genetics.thetech.org/ask/ask166), and so why would we expect our addition to seem any different from any other being to which we've attributed to be human?
It seems to me your thought experiment pre-supposes the existence of the bridge, in such a way that it could be known by an omniscient observer. "they are constructing their own idea of what a bridge ***is***"
ReplyDeleteP.S. if i've used omnipotent or omnipresent earlier, my apologies--I meant omniscient. I'm watching ESPN pregame stuff (don't know if that makes some goofy joke)
On the bottle and it's properties (and the bridge) -- again, your position takes a stand on the existence of particular, knowable properties. This is fine--it seems to be how we operate on mathematics: we treat our mathematical ideas as if they exist, and then operate on them with that attribution. But these are not knowable things.
ReplyDeleteThe so-called "properties" of the coke bottle are not knowable external to a knower. You watched the bottle fall from the plane. you aligned that bottle with experiences of other similar objects/vessels. You have attributed these properties of the coke bottle to the bottle. If you believe these properties exist within the bottle itself, you make that as a statement of faith.
Now I guess I am responding to your present state of affairs :-)
ReplyDeleteThe issue of correctness is interesting to me. Very few people wish to give this up (as well as similar ideas--like expertise, etc.), and I cannot wrap my head around why, except to reference oneself as having a gods-perspective on knowing. Any evaluation to the "truth" of something is a construction of ones own mind. So one thing being more true, more expert, more correct is one's own declaration. And to make such a declaration lives within one's own ways of knowing--akin to naming oneself the expert on some knowledge.
Why would we do that ***if*** we truly attribute rationality to every and all other human in which we come into contact. If we expect of them to treat knowledge and knowing the way we do, then what they deem to be more correct, more true must ALSO be true, the correct declaration.
In other words, because I claim that the most ethically *just* position with which to view another is to attribute to them the same ability to discern truth and knowledge as we attribute to ourselves, we must also view their truth equivalent to our own.
There can be no knowledge/truth regime or hierarchy.
DeleteI think what we are talking about here has great implication with respect to not only mathematics education - but education in general. You can probably already guess where I am headed with that first sentence - but let me step back and consider what I thought your position on this was (before you clarified it a bit more). Within the framework that I though was suggested in the other post, I assumed that there was still a way of deciding on a "degree of correctness" in an individual's construction of ideas. And thus, this means that in education, our goal may be to develop each individual's ability to create a more coherent network of constructions - since "coherence" within each persons own networks - would be what determines "correctness" since there is no absolute correctness.
I now see (or maybe not?) that I was incorrect in developing those ideas based on what I thought you were referring to. According to your latest statement, "There can be no knowledge/truth regime or hierarchy." If this is so, then does it follow that the entire enterprise of education is s pointless pursuit? Since "slightly correct" and "more correct" are both simply "correct," then is improvement of understanding also a pointless pursuit?
It seems that treated this thing you are naming "mathematics" as "structural relationships" will allow for an interesting ontological and epistemological view through which to study the social milieu of learning SOME PARTICULAR THING -- this thing you've declared, in your kingdom of knowing, from your omniscient perspective, to be mathematics.
ReplyDeleteI see that as a potentially quite productive approach to studying something that you feel you know some things about and would like to know more.
Yet (and my apologies for being a bit overbearing on the language above) what you learn will not be truths about the world, nor about mathematics, nor about the learning of mathematics. And I would argue the likelihood that the truth/knowledge regime cannot be escaped given the initial and underlying assumption of a more powerful / more knowing knower in making the conclusion.
For me, this is not an equitable way to do my work of interacting with my experiential reality to which I attribute the exist of beings not unlike myself.
You write: "mathematical objects do not exist" but the "structural relationships amongst objects do."
ReplyDeleteWhat for you is a mathematical object? is it not an abstraction of some sort from the experiential world? I wouldn't think a mathematical object "exists" -- in the sense of an existence in what I consider to be external reality.
But further, to me--relationships between mathematical objects seem to be even more clearly constructions of our mind.
At this stage I am reminded of Constance Kamii's (a Piagetian Scholar) writing about Physical Knowledge and Logico-Mathematical Knowledge. Check out her first chapter of "Children (Re)Invent Arithmetic"
Read a similar discussion on p. 132 of https://www.dropbox.com/s/uon6t2o8rww3sug/Harmful%20Effects%20of%20Teaching%20Algorithms.pdf?dl=0